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Abstract
Researchers typically analyze time-series–cross-section data with a binary
dependent variable (BTSCS) using ordinary logit or probit. However, BTSCS
observations are likely to violate the independence assumption of the ordinary
logit or probit statistical model. It is well known that if the observations are
temporally related that the results of an ordinary logit or probit analysis may
be misleading. In this paper, we provide a simple diagnostic for temporal
dependence and a simple remedy. Our remedy is based on the idea that
BTSCS data is identical to grouped duration data. This remedy does not
require the BTSCS analyst to acquire any further methodological skills and it
can be easily implemented in any standard statistical software package. While
our approach is suitable for any type of BTSCS data, we provide examples
and applications from the field of International Relations, where BTSCS data
is frequently used. We use our methodology to re-assess Oneal and Russett’s
(1997) findings regarding the relationship between economic interdependence,
democracy, and peace. Our analyses show that 1) their finding that economic
interdependence is associated with peace is an artifact of their failure to
account for temporal dependence and 2) their finding that democracy inhibits
conflict is upheld even taking duration dependence into account.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of time-series–cross-section data with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS
data) is becoming more common, particularly in the study of international relations (IR).
Moreover, the number of such studies appears to be increasing exponentially.1 Since its
unlikely that units are statistically unrelated over time, BTSCS observations, like their
continuous dependent variable TSCS cousins, are likely to be temporally dependent. It
is well known that violations of the assumption of independent observations can result
in overly optimistic inferences (underestimates of variability leading to inflated t-values).
Nevertheless, BTSCS data is almost invariably analyzed using ordinary logit or probit
analysis, in spite of the fact that these techniques assume that observations are temporally
independent.2 While analysts are certainly aware of the pitfalls of such action, they are
seemingly unaware of a very simple solution.
Our simple solution is to add a series of dummy variables to the logit specification.
These variables mark how many periods (usually years) have occurred since either the
start of the sample period or the previous occurrence of an “event” (such as war). A stan-
dard statistical test on whether these dummy variables belong in the specification is a test
of whether the observations are temporally independent. The addition of these dummy
variables to the specification, if the test indicates they are needed, corrects for temporally
dependent observations. While we also discuss some slightly more complicated variants
of this solution, the simple solution, which can be implemented in any software pack-
age, allows for accurate estimation of the parameters of temporally dependent BTSCS
models.3
This simple solution is based on the recognition that BTSCS data is grouped duration
data. Note that we do not say “like grouped duration data;” BTSCS data is grouped
duration data. Once we recognize that BTSCS data is grouped duration data, it is then
easy to use well understood and well validated event history methods, methods that are
explicitly designed for temporally dependent data.4
1A brief list of IR BTSCS analyses using ordinary logit or probit published in the previous 18 months
includes Barbieri (1996), Bennett (1996), Enterline(1996, 1997), Farber and Gowa (1997), Gartzke
(1998), Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), Hermann and Kegley (1996), Huth (1996), Lemke and Reed (1996),
Mansfield and Snyder(1996, 1997), Maoz(1996, 1997), Mousseau (1997), Oneal et al. (1996) and Oneal
and Russett (1997). We do not claim that these studies draw incorrect conclusions. However, the possi-
bly faulty (and untested) assumption of temporal independence, inherent in their respective logit/probit
analyses, casts serious doubt about the validity of their substantive findings. While the vast majority
of IR BTSCS analysts study militarized conflict or interstate war, others analysts study alliance and
rivalry behavior.
2We freely mix logit and probit analyses here. In the context of this paper they suffer identical flaws
which have identical remedies. For simplicity we refer to logit analysis throughout this paper. Those
committed to probit analysis should make our recommended changes to the probit specification.
3In this paper we limit ourselves to issues of temporal dependence. While cross-sectional dependence
also causes problems, temporal dependence, in general, has more serious statistical consequences. Our
proposed remedy for temporal dependence is sufficiently simple that it should be easy to adjoin to any
remedy for cross-sectional dependence. But our goal here is to only remedy the one problem of temporal
dependence.
4We use the terms event history methods and duration models interchangeably.
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In the next section, we briefly discuss the prominence of BTSCS data in international
relations and why ordinary logit is inappropriate for BTSCS data in most contexts.
The subsequent section illustrates the equivalence of BTSCS and grouped duration data.
Here, we also delineate our proposed method for analyzing temporally dependent BTSCS
data and discuss several issues in applying it to the study of conflict/peace.
Bruce Russett and his colleagues (Russett 1990; Maoz and Russett 1992; Maoz and
Russett 1993; Russett 1994; Oneal et al. 1996) have pioneered one of the most important
current research projects about the causes of militarized conflict.5 Their work on “Demo-
cratic Peace” has captivated IR researchers. We employ our methodology to reanalyze his
research group’s most recently published and, arguably, most rigorous, empirical effort.
Oneal and Russett (1997), in an effort to further explore the interrelationship between
liberalism (political and economic) and war, found that higher levels of democracy and
economic interdependence lowered the probability of militarized conflict among pairs of
nations in the post-World War II period. However, they assumed that their observations
are independent. When we correct for temporal dependence in the Oneal and Russett
data we find that there is no relationship between trade and the onset of militarized
conflict (although we do find that trade decreases the duration of conflict). We continue
to find support for the democratic peace hypothesis.
2 BTSCS Data in International Relations
BTSCS data is most common in international relations, though it is not limited to this
arena. The IR conflict processes literature has favored a theoretical emphasis on dyadic
interstate interactions (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Diehl and Goertz
1993; Vasquez 1993) and an empirical focus on the dyad-year as the unit-of-analysis
(e.g., Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993). Dyad-year data sets typically contain
yearly observations on whether or not a pair of nations has had a conflict (or engaged in
some other interstate behavior such as alliance formation or rivalry dissolution). These
datasets also include properties of the dyad (which may vary from year to year) that
serve to explain the presence or absence of conflict. While our argument generalizes to
all BTSCS data, we couch our discussion in terms of IR dyad-year studies of conflict.
BTSCS data shares all the standard characteristics of continuous dependent vari-
able time-series–cross-section data.6 Formally, a BTSCS model with binary dependent
dependent variable, y, and a vector of independent variables, x, has
P (yi,t = 1) = f(xi,t, yi,1, . . . , yi,t−1,xi,1, . . . ,xi,t−1),
i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T (1)
5More than seventy-five articles have been published or presented at conferences in the last five
years that have relied on sample selection criteria, variable measurement, or substantive foci originally
developed or pursued by Russett and the members of his group.
6See Beck and Katz (1995, N.d.) for a discussion of continuous dependent variable TSCS methods.
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where f is any suitable function that has a range of the unit interval. The inclusion of
the lagged values of y and x allows for a very general form of temporal dependence of
the observations.7
We assume that the number of time points (T ) is reasonably large (say at least 20).
This is in contrast to binary panel data, where T may be as small as two or three. Panel
methods are also designed to handle enormous cross-section sample sizes (N), ranging
into the thousands. While N is not critical for our interests here, we do not have to solve
the problems brought about by large (and asymptotically unbounded) N ’s that have
plagued panel analysts. This contrast is important, since there are available estimation
techniques for interdependent binary panel data (see Diggle, Liang and Zeger 1994).
While some of these techniques may prove useful for interdependent BTSCS data, such
utility has not yet been demonstrated. But, in general, the temporal dimension of BTSCS
data is so much richer than its panel counterpart that we would not be overly optimistic
about the utility of panel methods for BTSCS data.
Analysts almost invariably simplify Equation 1 to
P (yi,t = 1|xi,t) =
1
1 + e−xi,tβ
(2)
and perform an“ordinary logit” analysis of their data.
BTSCS data, however, is simply a variant of TSCS data, and we know that TSCS data
often shows temporal dependence. Would we not expect BTSCS data to show temporal
dependence as well? The probability of dyadic conflict in a given year, for example,
is likely to be dependent on the conflict history of that dyad. Remedies for continuous
dependent variable TSCS data (Beck and Katz N.d.), however, are inapplicable to BTSCS
data.
It is well known that if the observations are temporally related then the results of
an ordinary logit or probit analysis may be misleading. Poirier and Ruud (1988) show
that probit8 standard errors are incorrect for time series data with serially correlated
errors. These time series results hold for BTSCS data. While Poirier and Ruud do
show that probit provides consistent parameter estimates, they also show that ignoring
temporal dependence leads to possibly severe inefficiency. Thus ignoring temporal de-
pendence means that we are not taking advantage of all the information in our data, and
that, for sure, reported statistical tests are incorrect. Simulations reported in Beck and
Katz (1997) show that these problems are severe, with reported standard errors possibly
understating variability by 50% or more!
7Equation 1 is very general. One possible specialization is a latent variable formulation, where
temporal dependence is induced by serially correlated errors in the latent variable (Beck and Katz 1997).
Equation 1 does not imply that one should add a lagged dependent variable to the logit specification.
The essential non-linearity of BTSCS models makes their dynamics much more complex than continuous
TSCS models.
8Their conclusions hold for logit and any other standard binary dependent variable method.
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IR BTSCS analysts have routinely acknowledged these problems, yet seeing no better
alternative, they ignore temporal dependence and use ordinary logit analysis. Farber and
Gowa (1997, 397), for example, agree that “the yearly observations for a dyad cannot
be considered to be independent” but they “proceed ignoring this lack of independence.
While [they] recognize that the power of [their] tests is somewhat overstated as a result,
a better solution is not obvious.” Oneal and Russett (1997, 283) note that the “greatest
danger arises from autocorrelation, but that there are not yet generally accepted means
of testing for or correcting this problem in logistic regressions.”9 Some BTSCS analysts
have simply given up on logit based methods, opting for less well-known event history
methods. Bennett (1997, 12), for example, argues that a “hazard [event history] model
is the most appropriate way to analyze alliance durations, and superior to the [ordinary
logit] procedure, since hazard models allow corrections for censoring, heterogeneity and
duration dependence.”
In this paper we will show that the logit, once corrected, is an event history method for
BTSCS data. Moreover, we show that a simple and easy to implement modification to the
logit specification allows it to handle temporally dependent data. Thus our methodology
allows logit oriented BTSCS analysts to continue to use their familiar methods while
deriving all the benefits of event history analysis.10
3 BTSCS Data is Grouped Duration Data
Our solution depends on the recognition that BTSCS data is identical to grouped dura-
tion data. While we need very little of the specialized language of event history analysis,
a few concepts will prove helpful.11 Event history analysts model the elapsed time until
an “event” or “failure,” or, equivalently, the length of a non-eventful “spell.” In our IR
examples an event is conflict, with the duration of spells of peace being modeled. A unit
has “survived” or is “at risk” until it fails.12 The “hazard” rate is, loosely speaking, an
indication of how likely failure is to occur at any given time (or more precisely the rate of
failure in any small time interval), given that the unit has survived until that time. If the
hazard rate is time invariant, that is, the risk of failure does not depend on how long a
unit has survived, the hazard is said to be “duration independent;” if it varies with time,
the hazard rate is said to show “duration dependence.” Event history analysts model the
hazard rate as a function of independent variables, which may be either time invariant
or time varying.
The most common event history methods assume continuous time, so that durations
are measured continuously and hazard rates vary continuously. But duration data may
9They attempt various ad hoc remedies. We discuss these in the re-analysis section.
10We surely have no objection to Bennett’s approach of using standard event history methods, other
than that it requires analysts to learn a whole new methodology.
11Introductions to event history methods for political scientists are in Beck (N.d.) and Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (1997).
12For simplicity for now assume only one possible failure per unit. We relax this assumption below.
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be “grouped,” so that we only know whether a unit has failed in some discrete time
interval (with independent variables only measured to the fineness of that interval). This
is usually a result of the measurement process, so that instead of recording the exact
time of failure, we only record whether a unit failed in some fixed time interval. BTSCS
data, as coded, only allows us to know if a conflict occurred sometime during a year.13
Annual BTSCS data is equivalent to grouped duration data with an observation
interval of one year.14 The dichotomous dependent variable is one in a given year if there
was a failure (for example, conflict) during that year, with the independent variables also
being measured yearly.15 We stress that BTSCS data is, by definition, grouped event
history data; no sophisticated mathematical, statistical nor computational argument is
required to demonstrate this.
3.1 The grouped duration solution
Having noticed the equivalence, we also note that there are standard methods for esti-
mating grouped event history data where the yearly observations are not independent.
These are typically derived by starting with a continuous time model and then assum-
ing that observations are only made in discrete intervals, with only one event possible
per interval.16 The most common continuous time duration model is the Cox (1975)
proportional hazards model; this model dominates applied work in the social and life
13The beginning and end of conflicts can obviously be dated much more finely, often to the day.
Raknerud and Hegre (1997), for example, use the daily dating of wars to convert a BTSCS data set
into a continuous time event history data set (since they are interested in the order in which nations
join multilateral conflicts). But while it may be possible to date events more finely, many independent
variables are only measured yearly. Our interest is in the use of event history methods to analyze data
that has already been coded as BTSCS data.
14Some analysts refer to discrete time duration data rather than grouped duration data. Grouped
duration data allows for exits at any time, but we only observe whether an exit has occurred in some
time interval; with discrete time exits only occur at discrete time intervals. BTSCS data is grouped, not
discrete time. We do not contend that wars only occur on New Year’s Eve! But the distinction has few,
if any, practical implications, since discrete time models are analyzed using grouped time concepts.
15Note that we are assuming that there can be no more than one measured conflict in a year. This
may be due to a censoring process, where the only recorded information is whether at least one conflict
occurred in a year, or it may be due to something about the conflict process which limits conflicts to
one per year. BTSCS data is presented this way. Analysts may have a choice as to whether to use a
binary dependent variable or an event count dependent variable; our discussion assumes that either the
investigator or some outside data collector has previously decided to only collect information about the
binary dependent variable. Alt, King and Signorino (1997) provide a very interesting treatment of this
entire issue. Our point here is much simpler than their’s, since we assume that aggregation decisions
have already been made, and so only BTSCS data is available. Event count TSCS models will also have
to take duration dependence into account.
16The grouped duration model was first derived by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978). Very readable
social science treatments are in Allison (1982) and Jenkins (1995). For completeness we lay out the
basic argument in an appendix, although it is dependent on some duration results not contained in this
paper. Sueyoshi (1995) provides a modern econometric treatment of many of the issues discussed here.
Katz and Sala (1996) have applied the grouped duration model to Congressional data.
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sciences.17
In this model the instantaneous hazard rate is
h(t|xi,t) = h0(t)e
xi,tβ (3)
where xi,t is the vector of independent variables at (continuously measured) time t. In
this setup the hazard of exit depends both on the independent variables (via the exi,tβ
term) and on how long the unit has been at risk (via h0(t), the “baseline hazard”).
The proportional hazards model is heavily used because it allows for estimation of the
parameters of interest (β) in the presence of an unknown, and possibly very complicated,
time varying baseline hazard.18 As we shall see, the β in Equation 3 are what logit BTSCS
modelers are estimating. Ordinary logit fails because it doesn’t allow for a (non-constant)
baseline hazard.
The grouped duration model, although derived from an underlying continuous time
Cox proportional hazards model, is much easier to estimate. Moreover, it does not suffer
from some problems inherent in the continuous time model.19 For notational simplicity,
let us assume annual data indexed by year t. The “discrete hazard” in year t for dyad
i is just the probability of that dyad experiencing conflict sometime during that year.
Letting yi,t be a binary indicator of conflict in dyad i sometime in year t, the discrete
hazard is just P (yi,t = 1) This is the probability estimated by logit analysis. But the logit
probability (Equation 2) is not the same as the discrete hazard constructed by aggregating
the continuous hazard rate of Equation 3. The discrete hazard rate corresponding to
Equation 3 is (as shown in the Appendix)
P (yi,t = 1|xi,t) = h(t|xi,t) = 1− exp(−e
xi,tβ + κt−t0) (4)
where xi,t now represents the observed value of the independent variable for the entire
year t. κt−t0 is a dummy variable marking the length of the sequence of zeros that precede
the current observation; for first events, t0 = 0. We use t − t0 instead of the simpler t
subscript because the notation must allow for multiple events; in that case t0 marks the
17The assumption of proportional hazards is not innocuous and surely there are situations where it
is a bad assumption. But Equation 3 is more general than other common hazard specifications used in
event history analysis. The Weibull model is the most common fully parametric event history model.
The Weibull model uses a hazard rate which is a special case of Equation 3, with h0(t) assumed to follow
a specific parametric form. In practice the proportional hazards model works well, but no one model
is perfect for all situations. Since, as we shall see, ordinary logit can be derived from a special case of
the proportional hazards model, any criticism of proportional hazards is at least as strong a criticism of
ordinary logit.
18The grouped model could easily be adapted to fully parametric duration models. Given the dom-
inance of the semi-parametric Cox approach in applied work, we see no reason to pursue the fully
parametric approach here. Alt, King and Signorino (1997) derive the grouped model for a continuous
time gamma duration model.
19In particular, the continuous time model has problems if there are many units that exit at the same
time.
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time of the previous event and t− t0 is the length of the spell of peace from t0 until t.20
We use the more complicated notation even when t0 = 0 to remind us that the temporal
dummies mark the length of prior spells of peace which will not always be the current
year index, t.
3.2 The logit solution
The grouped duration model differs from ordinary logit in two ways. First, it is a binary
dependent variable model using what is known as a “complementary log-log (cloglog)
link” instead of the more familiar logit (or probit) link.21 Second, the specification
contains the temporal dummy variables, κt−t0. The distinction between the cloglog and
logit links is trivial; the inclusion of the temporal dummy variables is not. Let us eliminate
the trivia first.
The cloglog vs. logit link
The two links transform probabilities by
cloglog(P) = log(− log(1− P )) and (5)
logit(P) = log
(
P
1− P
)
(6)
(These are the inverses of the transforms used in Equations 4 and 7.) They are plotted
in Figure 1.
We see that the two links are almost identical if the probability of an event is less than
25%, and are extremely similar so long as the probability of an event does not exceed
50%. If the probabilities of an event are not large it simply does not matter whether we
use a logit or a cloglog link. And for typical event history data (especially in IR) the
probability of an event in any given time period will be small. The two links will only differ
in the unlikely case (for event history data) that many observations have a probability
of failure exceeding 50%. And even here, who is to say whether the cloglog model is the
right model? While the cloglog model is the exact grouped duration analogue of the Cox
20To be concrete we show one particular assignment of the κ.
t | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
y | 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
κ | κ1 κ2 κ3 κ4 κ1 κ2 κ1 κ1 κ2
As with any saturated set of dummy variables we must either not estimate a constant term or drop one
dummy variable. For notational simplicity we assume the former, though most statistical packages do
the latter. This should cause no problems.
21This terminology is from the “generalized linear model” (GLM) approach (McCullagh and Nelder
1989). A link function specifies the relationship between a linear predictor (xi,tβ) and the dependent
variable. The logit and cloglog links are two common links for binary dependent variable models.
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Figure 1: Comparison of cloglog and logit transforms
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proportional hazards model, and while the Cox proportional hazards is the most widely
used model, is it is exactly the right model in all cases? The logit link corresponds to
some (complicated) continuous time duration model (Sueyoshi 1995). While the Cox
proportional hazards model is computationally convenient, there is no reason to assume
that data is generated in a computationally convenient form. For typical BTSCS data
there appears to be no cost to using the more familiar logit link.
But there are clear benefits to using the logit link. It is well understood by researchers,
is estimable with any software package, does not require learning new methods (general-
ized linear models) and, most importantly, is easier to extend in a variety of interesting
ways.22 We therefore recommend that researchers use
P (yi,t = 1|xi,t) = h(t|xi,t) =
1
1 + e−(xi,tβ+κt−t0)
(7)
which is the logistic analogue of Equation 4.
22Allison (1982, 87-90) shows how the logit can be extended to the multinomial logit to handle multiple
types of failures. Thus we could allow for data where yi,t denotes a series of unordered outcomes, so long
as the outcomes satisfy the independent risks assumption underlying the “competing risks” model. Any
remedies which allow logit to deal with cross-sectional dependence will also be easy to combine with the
logit link.
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Temporal dummy variables
Using the logit rather than the cloglog link allows us to focus on the second way that
Equation 7 differs from ordinary logit: the inclusion of the temporal dummies, κt−t0.
These are the grouped duration analogue of the continuous time baseline hazard func-
tion, h0. Omitting these dummies is equivalent to assuming that the baseline hazard is
constant, so that the model shows duration independence. While such a situation can oc-
cur, event history analysts typically allow for duration dependence, at least initially, and
then test for whether the model can be simplified by imposing duration independence.
The costs of incorrectly imposing duration dependence are, at a minimum, inefficiency
and incorrect standard errors, and may, in complicated cases, even lead to inconsistent
parameter estimates. It is exactly these problems that the Cox proportional hazard
model avoids.23
It is simple enough to include the temporal dummies in the logit specification. Before
doing so one should test whether they are required. Temporal dummies should not be
included in the specification if the observations are already temporally independent, since
the temporal dummies might then introduce unnecessary multicollinearity. The test of
whether the temporal dummies should be included is a standard likelihood ratio test of
the hypothesis that all the κt−t0 = 0. If the null hypothesis of temporal independence
is rejected then all the κt−t0 should be included in the logit specification. Thus Equa-
tion 7 is the generalization of ordinary logit that allows for temporally interdependent
observations. It is, as we have just seen, easy to both test for, and correct the logit for,
temporally dependent observations.
Cubic splines
Equation 7 requires the estimation of the coefficients of many dummy variables. Unless
N is large these will not be precisely estimated. While this is not a problem if our interest
is in estimating β, we may have some interest in the κ themselves. Note that the κt−t0
are easily interpretable as “baseline” probabilities (or hazards) in that
P (yi,t = 1|xi,t = 0, t0) = κt−t0 (8)
While the path traced out by the κt−t0 is easily interpretable, the imprecision with
which the κ are estimated may give a false impression that the baseline hazard is jagged.
We would expect it to be smooth. One solution to this problem is to replace the dummy
variables in Equation 7 with a smooth function of t− t0. (We cannot directly use t− t0
since there is no reason to assume that the baseline hazard is a linear function of time.) In
earlier work we recommended “cubic smoothing splines” (Beck and Jackman 1997; Beck
and Tucker 1996). But while these work very nicely, they do require software (such as
23The Cox proportional hazard model differs from parametric duration models such as the Weibull in
that the baseline hazard, h0 is not specified in the Cox formulation; parametric approaches require the
researcher to fully specify h0. Theory is often (perhaps usually) silent about the specification of h0.
10
S-Plus) that is often not readily accessible. One can obtain almost the same degree of
smoothness with “natural cubic splines” (Eubank 1988). The advantage of these is that
they are easy to implement with widely available software packages (such as the spbase
program available for Stata).
Natural cubic splines fit cubic polynomials to a predetermined number of subintervals
of a variable. These polynomials are joined at “knots,” with the number and placement
of the knots specified by the analyst. Smoothness is imposed by forcing the splines, and
their first and second derivatives, to agree at each of the knots. Thus each knot only uses
up one degree of freedom, so that we can flexibly fit a cubic spline using up only a very
few degrees of freedom. The estimated spline coefficients can then be used to trace out
the path of duration dependence.
One advantage of the spline is that it facilitates a test of the hypothesis of duration
dependence. With many temporal dummy variables the likelihood ratio test for whether
they are all zero may have poor finite sample properties. The equivalent test on the
spline formulation only requires testing whether a small number of spline coefficients are
zero.
Analysts can freely choose either the dummy variable or the spline formulation. This
choice has almost no consequences for the estimation of β. We have a slight preference
for the spline formulation, but users hesitant to deal with natural splines can resort to
the simpler dummy variable specification with little loss. We use both approaches in our
replication, though we rely primarily on the spline approach.
Since the logit with temporal dummy (or spline) variables is more general than or-
dinary logit, and since we can easily test the null hypothesis of duration independence,
there is no reason not to undertake logit analysis of BTSCS data adding the temporal
variables if they are required. This is not to say that there might not be better methods
for estimating some models. While the Cox proportional hazards model is widely used
and works well in practice, no model can be expected to be optimal for all problems. But
we expect that logit analysis with temporal dummy or spline variables will work well for
most BTSCS data sets. There can be no doubt that this approach is superior to ordinary
logit.
3.3 Complications
Before turning to our re-analysis, there are several complications that we must discuss.
These complications would not arise if the data were independent, but they are inherent
if we are unwilling to make that assumption. The event history approach simply makes
these problems (and possible solutions) clearer.
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Multiple failures
The first problem is that BTSCS data allows for multiple failures per unit. Many event
history analyses simply model time until the first (or only) failure, but the nature of
BTSCS data allows for more than one failure per unit.24 Ordinary logit avoids any
problems by assuming that the probability of failure in any year is the same as in any
other year (conditional only on the independent variables), so that second and subsequent
failures are assumed to be generated identically to first failures. In our construction of
the κ’s we have also used this assumption, since the only relevant information in the κ
is time since the most recent event. However implausible the assumption that second
and subsequent events are are independent of the number and timing of previous events,
this assumption is weaker than the ordinary logit assumption that all observations are
independent.
Since the assumption that second spells are independent of first spells is questionable,
one solution might be to limit the analysis to the initial event. While losing data on
second events is inefficient, it does allow for consistent estimation of β without having to
model the dependence of second and later events on earlier events. Of course it would
be better to correctly model repeated events. One easy way to do this is to include in
the specification a variable which counts the number of previous events. This approach,
while primitive, is better than ignoring the problem.
A related issue that is common in IR studies is that events may appear to take place
over the course of several years. If conflicts really are multi-year we should simply drop all
but the first year of the conflict from the analysis. If we have a theory about the duration
of peace we should not include spells of conflict in testing that theory. But it also may
be the case that we observe different conflicts in consecutive years, and so discarding the
subsequent years of multi-year conflicts is really discarding new, but very short, spells of
peace. A decision about what to do here can only be made on theoretical grounds. But
if we observe multi-year spells of conflict it is hard to maintain the assumption that the
yearly observations are independent of each other. Duration dependence may manifest
itself in the finding that conflicts are more likely to follow other conflicts.
Left censoring
The second problem has to do with what event history analysts call “left censoring.”
Spells are left censored if we do not know when they began.25 For example, if our first
dyadic observation is 1951, we do not know if a spell of peace began in 1951, 1950 or
before. This may not be a large problem in IR, since we can often begin analyses at
the start of a new international order or security regime (the Congress of Vienna or the
24If only one failure per unit were possible, we should discard all data after the first failure. But in
BTSCS data we have observations through a fixed time T .
25Spells are “right censored” if we do not know when they ended. These are not a problem for grouped
duration logit analysis. Units that are right censored simply contribute a string of zeros, with no final
one, to the logit likelihood.
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beginning of the Cold War). Our proposed method is also forgiving of left censoring so
long as all observations are equally left censored. For example, if the Cold War started
in 1947, but our data starts in 1954, left censoring causes literally no problems for our
proposed method.26 All that is required is that the κ for any given year reflect the same
length of prior peace spell length for all units.
This could cause problems, for example, for dyads that enter the data set after the
starting year. In our re-analysis, for example, some dyads enter the data set after one
of the members became independent. Suppose the data set begins in 1951 but a dyad
enters the data set in 1962. Should the dummy variable for that observation be κ1 or
κ12? If our example (and in our re-analysis) it seems reasonable to use κ1 here. But
analysts will have to make judgments before beginning their own data analysis. Result
should be relatively insensitive to a few differences in judgment on this issue.
Variables that are fixed across units
The third potential problem with our method is that it does not allow researchers to
use independent variables that vary by time but not across units. In IR such variables
are measured at the system level. Some examples of systemic level variables are the
concentration of power or the number of nation-states in the world at any given time.
These variables will be highly collinear with the κ.27 Inclusion of the κ in the specification
makes it unlikely that the coefficients of these systemic variables will remain statistically
significant. This will cause problems for some, but not all, research agendas.28 Systemic
level variables are, for example, rare in dyad-year studies of conflict.
If system level variables account for most of the duration dependence, then our test
for it will indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis of duration independence. At
that point researchers can confidently use ordinary logit analysis including system level
variables. This is the optimal situation, since the system level variables theoretically
explain duration dependence. We fear that this situation is rare.
There may be other situations that remain problematic. If the system level variables
are important we might choose to ignore duration dependence if it is not serious (as
indicated by a baseline hazard function that looks fairly flat). Sometimes the cure may
be worse than the disease! There will remain some situations where the researcher is
simply faced with a choice between two evils. The analysis of data is an art, not a science.
26All we lose are estimates of the nuisance yearly dummies from 1948 through 1953. See Jenkins
(1995) for a formal proof and a good discussion of the interaction of grouped duration analysis with
various sampling designs. Suppose the sample period begins with t2 but that spells actually began at
t1 < t2. Jenkins shows that this is irrelevant for the estimation of β.
27They are not perfectly collinear if there are multiple events per unit, since the κ then no longer
simply mark t. They will also not be perfectly collinear with the temporal spline. But they might be
highly collinear.
28The problem is identical to that associated with fixed unit effects in models with independent
variables that are constant within units. This problem has not caused researchers to abandon fixed
effects modeling.
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One simple method will never solve all possible problems. But a test for whether the
temporal variables belong in the logit specification, even with the system level variables
included, at least alerts the researcher to the existence of problems caused by temporally
dependent observations.
Missing data
The fourth problem is that missing data becomes more troublesome in the presence of
duration dependence. The assumption of independence allows the analyst to omit all
observations with missing data, subject, of course, to the usual caveats about missing
data (Little and Rubin 1987). Our method also allows for the elimination of observations
with missing data so long as the correct time dummy variable is still used. Thus we cannot
allow missing observations on the dependent variable (or we must assume that we are
missing no years of conflict). In practice we will encounter relatively little if any missing
data in the conflict variable, since IR researchers have gone to great lengths to code this
data. But missing data on the dependent variable could be a potential problem in other
types of BTSCS analyses. Keeping these problems in mind, we now turn to a re-analysis
of one prominent BTSCS study.
4 Reassessing the Liberal Peace
One of the most prominent propositions in the IR/IPE literature is that democracies
do not wage war on each other. Levy (1988) has implied that this is the only law-like
generalization in IR and has been confirmed in myriad empirical studies.29 Classical eco-
nomic liberals have argued that economic interdependence also inhibits war. The idea
that trading partners are less likely to engage in military conflict has also received ex-
tensive empirical support for almost two decades.30 Oneal et al. (1996) strengthened the
confidence in these findings by showing that the effects of economic interdependence an
democracy were inversely related to the onset of military hostilities, even when controlling
for several important confounding factors.
Oneal and Russett (1997) claim to have improved upon the Oneal et al. (1996) speci-
fication in an effort to further connect these two major strands of research on the causes
of conflict. Oneal and Russett found that, during the Cold War era, trade, as well as
democracy, inhibits militarized conflict. These results, seemingly the most robust of their
genre, appear to have solidified the conventional wisdom regarding the relationships be-
tween economic interdependence, democracy, and war. They therefore conclude that the
classical liberal prescription for peace, trade and democracy, is correct.
29For a recent overviews of the democratic peace literature see Chan (1997) and Ray (1997).
30The first prominent statistical study was conducted by Polachek (1980) and the most recent analysis
can be found in Gartzke (1998). For a recent overview of the economic interdependence literature see
McMillan (1997).
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Oneal and Russett (hereinafter O/R) performed ordinary logit analyses on BTSCS
data without accounting for temporal dependence. We use our proposed method to
re-analyze their data to see whether their findings survive more appropriate statistical
tests. The dataset we use, provided by O/R, contains 20990 dyad-years, comprised of 827
“politically relevant dyads” observed annually from 1951 through 1985.31 Some dyads
were observed for all 35 years, while others were observed for a shorter sub-period. The
median observation length is 22 years.32
The dependent variable is DISPUTE, whether or not a dyad engaged in a militarized
dispute in a given year. While earlier researchers typically used interstate war as a de-
pendent variable, recent research has frequently examined militarized interstate disputes.
Interstate wars are a small subset of militarized interstate disputes. The latter include
any event involving the threat or actual use of military force while the former require a
substantial number of battle deaths.33
The two key independent variables are democracy (DEM), and economic interdepen-
dence (TRADE). Both of these are dyadic measures. DEM is constructed by creating
democracy scores (using Polity III data) for each member of the dyad and taking the
dyadic score as the lesser of the two (Oneal and Russett refer to this as the “weak link”
assumption). We rescaled DEM to run from -1 to 1. TRADE measures the importance
of dyadic trade to the less trade oriented of the two partners. The importance of trade is
measured by the ratio (in percent) of dyadic trade to the GDP of each partner. Following
O/R, TRADE is lagged one year so that low trade does not proxy a current dispute.
O/R also use a series of control variables. ALLIES is a dummy variable measuring
whether the dyad partners were allied (or both were allied with the United States). CON-
TIG is a dummy variable measuring whether both states are contiguous. CAPRATIO
measures the dyadic balance of power. Using the Correlates of War material capabilities
index, it is the ratio (in percent) of the stronger nation’s score to the weaker nation’s.
Lastly, GROWTH measures the lesser of the rates of economic growth (as a percent) of
the partners. Detailed discussion of the O/R data set and operationalizations is contained
in their original paper.
The analyses which correct for duration dependence either use a natural cubic spline
in PEACEYRS or the set of dummy variables created from PEACEYRS. PEACEYRS
counts the length of the spell of peace preceding the current observation. For observations
with no previous dyadic disputes, PEACEYRS is simply t, the time index; subsequent
to a dispute, PEACEYRS is t− t0 where t0 is the time index of the most recent recent
dispute. PEACEYRS runs from zero to 34.
31A dyad is “politically relevant” if the nations are geographically proximate or if one state is a major
power. The analysis of politically relevant dyad-years is a prominent IR BTSCS design.
32Their data set has gaps in some dyadic observations. We did not attempt to fill these in, but we
did correct the temporal variables for these gaps.
33We initially maintain O/R’s coding decision to count every dispute year as a separate dispute, even
when many of these were merely a continuation of the same event. To get a bit ahead of ourselves, this
decision turns out to have been crucial.
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Column I of Table 1 shows the original O/R results. We were able to replicate Oneal
and Russett’s original estimates exactly.34 We limit our re-analysis to the temporal
dependence issues discussed in our paper. We also examine only their specification one
and do not investigate alternative substantive models of conflict.35 These results show
that both democracy and economic interdependence lower the probability of a militarized
dispute; they appear to be both statistically and substantively significant. The control
variables, as O/R predicted, also exhibit substantively important effects.
A different picture emerges, however, once we correct for temporally dependent obser-
vations using grouped duration methods. Results are in Columns II and III for the logit
link and Column IV for the cloglog link. A test for whether the temporal dummies are
required (a likelihood ratio test of I vs II) or whether the temporal splines are required (I
vs III) clearly show strong duration dependence; this can also be easily seen by looking
at the t-ratios of the four terms that comprise the cubic spline in PEACEYRS: 14, 9, 7
and 4.36 Thus the O/R logits clearly show duration dependence.
Estimation that accounts for duration dependence has dramatic consequences for the
O/R finding. The effect of trade, in particular, is reduced by a factor of five (and becomes
statistically insignificant). These results provide no evidence for a liberal economic peace.
Not all coefficients are affected by controlling for duration dependence. Our re-analysis
leaves the DEM coefficient and standard error almost unchanged. Thus while we find no
support for the liberal economic peace, the liberal political peace hypothesis is upheld.37
The consequence of controlling for duration dependence on any variable is difficult to
predict in advance. But, as we see here, the consequences of failing to account for
duration dependence in typical logit estimation are enormous.
4.1 Links and splines
We also observe that it makes no difference whether we use the logit or cloglog link. The
estimates for the two different links are even more similar than Table 1 (Columns II and
IV) indicates, since the transformation of the independent variables into probabilities
differs slightly between the two links. The mean difference in predicted probabilities
between the two models is .007% with only about 2% of all dyad-years having predicted
34All of our analyses were done with Stata, Version 5. Note that some variables were rescaled to make
for simpler tables.
35Their other specifications are similar to the one we re-examine here. We have applied our method
to their specifications two through six and obtained similar results.
36Likelihood ratio tests of specification II versus I yielded χ2 statistics of 1778 with 31 degrees of
freedom; the test of III versus I yields a statistic of 1789 with 4 degrees of freedom. The test of I versus
II drops 916 perfectly predicted observations from both logits so that log likelihoods are comparable. The
probability of obtaining either result by chance is, to computer precision, zero. Tests on specifications
in subsequent tables reveal similar results and are not shown here.
37The control variables are also differentially impacted. Although the effect of CAPRATIO is almost
unchanged in magnitude and statistical significance, the effects of the three other control variables are
cut by half (with GROWTH even becoming statistically insignificant).
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Table 1: Comparison of ordinary logit and grouped duration analyses
Ordinary Grouped Duration
Logit Logit Logit Cloglog
Dummya Spline Dummyb
Variable I II III IV
DEM −0.50 −0.55 −0.54 −0.49
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
GROWTH −2.23 −1.15 −1.15 −0.81
(0.85) (0.92) (0.92) (0.76)
ALLIES −0.82 −0.47 −0.47 −0.43
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
CONTIG 1.31 0.70 0.69 0.55
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
CAPRATIO −0.31 −0.30 −0.30 −0.30
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
TRADE −66.13 −12.67 −12.88 −12.50
(13.44) (10.50) (10.51) 9.96
Constant −3.29 −0.94 −0.96 −1.11
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
PEACEYRS −1.82
(0.11)
Spline(1)c −.24
(0.03)
Spline(2)c −.08
(0.01)
Spline(3)c −.01
(0.003)
Log Likelihood −3477.6 −2554.7 −2582.9 −2554.1
df 20983 20036 20979 20949
N=20990
Standard errors in parentheses
a31 temporal dummy variables in specification not shown
3 dummy variables and 916 observations dropped
due to outcomes being perfectly predicted
b34 temporal dummy variables in specification not shown
cCoefficients of of PEACEYRS cubic spline segments
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probabilities of a dispute differing by more than 1%. Thus, as we recommend, subsequent
analyses only use the logit link.
Results using a natural cubic spline in PEACEYRS are in Column III. Comparing
Columns II and III we see that it makes no difference in terms of estimating β whether
we use temporal dummy variables or a cubic spline in PEACEYRS. Since we have a
preference for the spline setup all subsequent analyses use the natural cubic spline in the
length of prior spells of peace.38
4.2 Why duration dependence affects the findings on economic
interdependence
Accounting for temporal dependence clearly has dramatic effects on O/R’s finding that
economic interdependence decreases conflict. Oneal and Russett (1997, 283) claim that
they theoretically expect a high correlation between trade and length of spells of peace,
and hence trade really does lessen conflict. But the problem in the O/R analysis is
not with a correlation between trade and length of spells of peace, but a correlation
between trade and lengths of spells of conflict, combined with a much higher than av-
erage probability of a conflict immediately following another conflict. Their proposed
solution, to regress PEACEYRS on TRADE and then add the residuals from that re-
gression to the logit specification, simply does not correct for temporal dependence. The
temporal variables added to the logit specification to correct for duration dependence
may not be arbitrarily changed without undoing the correction for temporally dependent
observations.39
We can understand why accounting for duration dependence so strongly affects the
O/R finding on trade by using some event history techniques. We begin with an examina-
tion of the estimated hazard function. This is computed for the logit analyses by setting
all independent variables at their means (except for the two dummy variables which are
38All splines allowed for three knots, placed at 1,4 and 7 years of peace. The number of knots was
chosen by a sequence of F -tests; a variety of knot placements were tried with the chosen placement
performing best. Results were insensitive to small changes in either the number or placement of the
knots. The natural cubic spline estimated here is very similar to the smoothing splines shown in Beck
and Jackman (1997) and Beck and Tucker (1996). We also reran the analyses for subsequent tables using
temporal dummy variable and obtained almost identical results. Figure 2 also shows that it matters
little if analysts add a cubic temporal spline or temporal dummy variables to the logit specification.
39They also claim that a modified Cochrane-Orcutt correction for temporal dependence did not change
their results. We know of no way to modify the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to handle BTSCS data.
Oneal and Russett (1997, 283) state that they “re-estimated [their] equation (6) with indicator variables
for all years but one [with] results consistent with those [they] report.” We re-estimated their Equation 6
with temporal dummies and found that the coefficient on trade dropped by a factor of four (and became
statistically insignificant), the coefficient on the trend of trade dropped by a factor of five (and also
became statistically insignificant). While the coefficients on the two democracy variables declined by
30%, they remain strongly statistically significant. Finally O/R report that bootstrapped standard errors
were only slightly different from their reported standard errors. Standard bootstrapping, however, does
not work with interdependent observations (Freedman and Peters 1984).
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set to their modal value of zero). The estimated hazard function, plotted against the
length of peace spell, (PEACEYRS), is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Discrete hazard of dispute
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The probability of a dispute immediately following a prior dispute is almost 25%. It
immediately falls to about 5% the next year, and then falls to about 2% the third year,
where it remains for the rest of the spell of peace. Thus, much of what the duration
dependent logit highlights is the dependence of the probability of a dispute on an im-
mediately preceeding dispute. Counting the latter years of multi-year disputes as new
disputes, and failing to correct for dependence between these disputes, is what leads to
their finding that trade lowers the probability of the onset of a dispute.
It appears that economic interdependence does not dampen the probability of a dis-
pute, but it does diminish the duration of a dispute once it occurs. Remember that
TRADE is lagged one year so that the previous year’s trade predicts the current prob-
ability of a dispute. Trade averages 0.22% of GDP prior to one year disputes This is
only slightly lower than the 0.23% of GDP that trade averages prior to a year of peace.
But, in the last year of peace prior to a multi-year dispute, trade averages only 0.15%
of GDP. Thus TRADE is not a good predictor of whether a dispute will occur, but it
is a good predictor of whether, if a dispute occurs, it will be lengthy. Low trade may
lengthen conflicts, but it does not appear to cause them.
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4.3 The effect of multiple disputes
We can further examine the contaminating effects of long spells of disputes by dropping
ongoing years of a dispute from the analysis. 542 dyad-years with a dispute are thus
dropped.40 Results of this analysis are in Table 2.
Table 2: Grouped Duration Analyses: No Continuing Dispute Years
I. Logit II. Logit
Ordinary Group Dur.
Variable β̂ se β̂ se
DEM −0.40 0.10 −0.39 0.10
GROWTH −3.43 1.25 −4.01 1.25
ALLIES −0.48 0.11 −0.37 0.11
CONTIG 1.35 0.12 0.99 0.12
CAPRATIO −0.20 0.05 −0.22 0.05
TRADE −21.08 11.30 −3.81 9.68
Constant −4.33 0.11 −3.57 0.17
PEACEYRS 0.39 0.16
Spline(1)a 0.09 0.03
Spline(2)a −0.03 0.01
Spline(3)a 0.003 0.003
Log Likelihood -1846.9 -1751.4
df 20441 20437
N=20448
aCoefficients of PEACEYRS cubic spline segments
Dropping the latter years of a dispute, even without accounting for duration depen-
dence, reduces the TRADE coefficient by a factor of three, leaving it barely statistically
significant. A likelihood ratio test, however, clearly shows remaining duration depen-
dence. When we account for this (Column II), the effect of dyadic trade is again greatly
reduced and is now not even close to being statistically significant. Dropping ongoing
dispute years, even accounting for duration dependence, has little effect on the democracy
coefficient.41
We can also examine the contaminating effects of disputes on later disputes by con-
fining our analysis to first disputes (eliminating observations on 3999 dyad years which
followed an initial dispute). This analysis avoids any problems associated with the need
to model the conditional probability of second and later disputes. Results are in Table 3,
Column I.
40All disputes that continue for more than one year are dropped, even if disputes in subsequent years
have differing identification codes.
41The estimated pacific impact of economic growth dramatically increases with the omission of ongoing
dispute years.
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Table 3: Grouped Duration Analyses: Second Disputes Differ
I. First Disputes II. Prior Disputes
Variable β̂ se β̂ se
DEM −0.46 0.13 −0.41 0.08
GROWTH −2.29 1.78 −2.09 0.97
ALLIES −0.42 0.16 −0.25 0.09
CONTIG 1.11 0.17 0.69 0.09
CAPRATIO −0.19 0.06 −0.20 0.04
TRADE −3.55 11.73 −9.39 10.19
PRIOR DISPUTES (#) 0.17 0.01
Constant −3.21 0.21 −1.60 0.10
PEACEYRS −1.08 0.24 −1.67 0.11
Spline(1)a −0.18 0.05 −0.22 0.03
Spline(2)a −0.07 0.02 0.07 0.01
Spline(3)a −0.01 0.05 −0.01 0.003
Log Likelihood -964.1 -2393.0
df 16980 20978
N 16691 20990
aCoefficients of PEACEYRS cubic spline segments
Limiting our analyses to time until the first dispute eliminates about 20% of the data
and results in an increase in all the standard errors. The pacific effect of democracy
remains almost unaffected by this limitation (other than the increase in standard error).
But once again there is a drastic decrease in the estimated impact of economic interde-
pendence. Increased dyadic trade does not reduce the likelihood of a first dyadic dispute;
democracy does.
A less drastic way to allow for differing conditional probabilities of a dispute given
the number of prior disputes is to add to the logit a counter measuring the number of
prior dyadic disputes. These results are in Table 3, Column II. While the results are not
as dramatic as the limitation to first disputes only, they clearly show the pacific effect of
democracy but not of trade.
Accounting for temporal dependence clearly has dramatic effects on O/R’s finding
that trade decreases conflict. When the O/R estimation is corrected for that dependence
the finding that trade reduces conflict simply disappears, although trade may reduce the
length of conflicts once they occur. Our reassessment of the O/R finding, however, leaves
intact their conclusion about the pacific effects of democracy.
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5 Conclusion
The analysis of binary dependent variable time-series–cross-section data is becoming
more common, particularly in the study of international conflict. Almost all analysis of
this type of data has used ordinary logit, ignoring any issues arising from the temporal
interdependence of the data. We have shown that that is easy to allow for temporal
dependence in logit analysis if we realize that BTSCS data is grouped duration data.
Such data can then be analyzed quite easily using a logit model but adding temporal
dummy variables (or a temporal spline) to the specification. This can be done using any
statistical software package.
This remedy has advantages over other attempts to correct for temporal dependence
in BTSCS data. Because it uses standard logit routines it is easy to combine our method
with remedies for other problems. In particular, it is simple to combine our method with
Huber (1967) standard errors, which solve other problems inherent in BTSCS data. It
is also easy to allow for heterogeneity using our method (Jenkins 1995). One would not
want to fix one problem such that it became extremely difficult to fix any other; real data
is seldom subject to only one problem. A related advantage is that logit is well-known
and well-understood by researchers.
Our proposed method, however, does force analysts to think about some problems
that naturally occur to the event history analyst (and which do not naturally occur to
the logit analyst). In particular, our approach requires analysts to think about whether
they are modeling spells of peace, spells of conflict, or both. It also requires consideration
of modeling second and subsequent events for the same unit. These considerations are
critical to the modeling process.
There are clearly other possible ways to allow for temporal dependence in BTSCS
data. Ideally we would model that dependence as a function of other variables. Our pro-
posed method simply treats temporal dependence as a nuisance which impedes estimation
of the β. Nothing is explained by noting that hazard rates change with time.
Our treatment of duration dependence is similar to early methods for estimating time
series models with serially correlated errors. While more modern treatments prefer the
modeling of dynamics to thinking of serially correlated errors as an estimation nuisance,
simply ignoring the nuisance can prove fatal. Current practice for BTSCS models is
much like using OLS for correlated time series data. A theoretically based specification
of this duration dependence would be best, but it is easier to give this advice than to
implement it. In the meantime we surely do not wish to continue the current practice of
ignoring potentially serious duration dependence.
We have applied our methodological remedy to Oneal and Russett’s analysis of mili-
tarized conflict during the Cold War period. Oneal and Russett found that both political
and economic liberalism inhibits conflict. Our re-analyses show that democracy clearly
inhibits conflict, but trade does not. But while trade may not inhibit conflict, it does
appear to shorten spells of conflict. The differences between the original analysis and
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our re-analysis are considerable. Temporal dependence in BTSCS models is not a minor
problem that can be ignored at the cost of a small error. And there is no reason to
commit these errors. The inclusion of temporal variables in the specification is a sim-
ple solution, available to all researchers, providing a low cost cure to the problem of
temporally dependent BTSCS data.
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Appendix A The Simple Math of Grouped
Durations
This appendix derives the grouped duration model. We present it here for completeness
and because many standard event history texts do not present this result. This appendix
assumes familiarity with basic duration concepts.
Start with a continuous time Cox proportional hazards model, so
hi(t) = h0(t)e
xi,tβ (9)
where i refers to units, t refers to continuous time, xi,t is a vector of independent variables
and h0(t) is the unspecified baseline hazard.
Letting S(t) be the probability of surviving beyond t, we use the basic identity that
S(t) = exp(−
∫ t
0
h(τ)dτ). (10)
We only observe whether or not an event occurred between time tk−1 and tk (assuming
annual data) and are interested in the probability of this event, P (yi,tk = 1). This
probability is one minus the probability of surviving beyond tk given survival up to
tk − 1. Assuming no prior events (so t0 = 0) Using Equation 10, we then get
P (yi,tk = 1) = 1− exp(−
∫ tk
tk−1
hi(τ)dτ) (11a)
= 1− exp(−
∫ tk
tk−1
exi,tkβh0(τ)dτ) (11b)
= 1− exp(−exi,tkβ
∫ tk
tk−1
h0(τ)dτ) (11c)
Since the baseline hazard is unspecified, we can just treat the integral of the baseline
hazard as an unknown constant. Defining
αtk =
∫ tk
tk−1
h0(τ)dτ and (12)
κtk = log(αtk) (13)
we then have
P (yi,tk = 1) = 1− exp(−e
xi,tk
βαtk) (14a)
= 1− exp(−exi,tkβ+κtk ) (14b)
This is exactly a binary dependent variable model with a cloglog link.
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